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TAGS: [AMGT](#) [ASEC](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [EAC](#) [COUNTER](#) [TERRORISM](#)

SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/07/2005

REF: A. SANAA 876

- [1](#)B. SANAA 875
- [1](#)C. SANAA 863
- [1](#)D. SANAA 860
- [1](#)E. SANAA 836

Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (S/NF) Summary: The Charge d' Affaires (CDA) convened a core EAC meeting at 1200 noon, on April 07, 2005, to review the current threat conditions at post. Following core EAC review, CDA decided to call an expanded EAC to decide upon further steps necessary to inform and protect the community. The EAC decided to restrict non-essential travel, share pre-cautions via a warden message with the community, continue focus on preventing non-essential TDY visits in country and recommended requesting "Authorized Departure" for eligible personnel. Key offices and personnel represented at the meeting included: CDA, CONS, DAO, FBI, FPD, IPC, MO, OMC, POLE, RSO, RMAS, USAID

[1](#)2. (S/NF) RMAS informed the EAC that to date no intervention had occurred against the terrorist cell currently being tracked by USG and ROYG agencies. Based on information reviewed, EAC members were told that attack planning was in progress, the threat remained serious and unpredictable and little was known about the location, method and target of attack. Furthermore, the latest information points to a higher possibility of imminent attacks. Therefore, EAC members determined that the threat warranted the following security steps in an attempt to shield the community from violence:

- Send a Warden Message to the community advising avoidance of any non-essential travel or movement in Sanaa and other major cities.
- Restrict employee travel to essential personnel traveling to the Embassy in armored vehicles on sporadic schedules.
- Close the Embassy for the first work day, Saturday, with reassessment to determine the necessity for closing the Embassy additional days.
- Suspend programs at Yemen American Language Institute (YALI) in line with Embassy closings.
- Recommend additional security measures to the Sanaa International School.
- Request (SEPTEL) Department approval for "Authorized Departure" of eligible personnel.
- Continue focus on sending home early or denying country clearance of TDY personnel not seen as critical for the enhancement of life-safety.
- Continue to monitor dramatic changes in employee travel times and routes to and from the Embassy.
- Activate the phone tree emergency notification system and remind the community to monitor the Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) radio network.

[1](#)3. (SBU) RSO recommended and Charge accepted re-locating himself to the Ambassador's residence on the Embassy compound to reduce protective service requirements to an from work and lower his profile by staying on the Embassy compound except for essential liaison with the ROYG.

[1](#)4. (C/NF) The Charge advised the EAC that he met with the Minister of Interior who assured him that extra measures would be taken per RSO's previous request to protect the Sheraton Hotel, Embassy compound, residences of the American Embassy as well as streets and avenues of approach between the Embassy and residential areas.

[1](#)5. (S/NF) RSO revisited security at YALI with the MOI the morning of 7 April 2005. Additionally, RSO is working with RMAS to develop a tear line to share with MOI providing names and additional details regarding the threat.

[1](#)6. (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene a core EAC meeting on Friday, 8 April 2005, to look into security updates and decide if more measures are needed or if an expanded EAC

needs to be convened.

Khoury